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How Long Do We Keep Fryeing?: 
The Future of Expert Scientific Evidence 
in California 
Kerri N. Polizzi* 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The screening of expert scientific evidence at trial is anything 
but a new issue. However, changes in the law and science may now 
be calling for a new solution. The number of modern cases involving 
expert evidence is staggering. One study found that ninety-two 
percent of federal civil trials involved expert testimony with nearly 
eight percent of experts in those trials representing scientific 
fields.1 This already striking number is exacerbated by the fact 
that the result of a hearing under either the Kelly-Frye or Daubert 
test is very often determinative of the survival and ultimate 
success of a case.2 In addition to these factors, it has been found 
that in federal courts “[m]ore evidence is being challenged, more 
excluded, and more summary judgments are being granted 
post-Daubert. Pretrial admissibility hearings are now a common 
occurrence in civil cases.”3 Given the strong policy interest in 
deciding cases on the merits, the current state of these affairs 
only adds to the importance of making these determinations 
under the best standard available. 
 
 * J.D. candidate, Chapman University Dale E. Fowler School of Law, anticipated 
May 2017. I would like to thank my friends and family for their unending love and 
support in every challenge that I take on. Specifically, none of this would have been 
possible without the help of my mother, Chantel Polizzi, my father, Paul Polizzi, and my 
advisor, Professor Mario Mainero. These three incredible people taught me everything I 
know about writing, hard work, and Evidence, respectively.  
 1 Carol Krafka, Meghan A. Dunn, Molly Treadway Johnson, Joe S. Cecil & Dean 
Miletich, Judge and Attorney Experiences, Practices, and Concerns Regarding Expert 
Testimony in Federal Civil Trials, 8 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 309, 318–20 (2002). 
 2 NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., DISCUSSIONS OF THE COMMITTEE 
ON DAUBERT STANDARDS: SUMMARY OF MEETINGS 1 (2006) (“In short, decisions on the 
admissibility of expert testimony can often determine the outcome of litigation.”). 
 3 Erica Beecher-Monas, Expert Testimony in Civil Cases, in THE FUTURE OF 
EVIDENCE: HOW SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY WILL CHANGE THE PRACTICE OF LAW, 39 (Carol 
Henderson & Jules Epstein eds., 2011).  
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California courts currently apply the Kelly-Frye test, requiring 
“general acceptance” in the relevant scientific community of a 
novel scientific technique upon which expert evidence would be 
based.4 In applying this test, a trial judge’s role is to simply tally 
up the number of members of the relevant scientific community 
who accept the validity of a novel technique and weigh that directly 
against the number of members who reject it. One prominent problem 
with this bean-counting approach is determining whether a given 
scientific technique is novel, such that the test must be applied, or 
has been sufficiently established such that it is no longer novel. 
Bright lines rarely exist, and this preliminary determination is 
further complicated as scientific communities continue to rapidly 
advance. Kelly-Frye also presents concerns about defining the 
relevant scientific community to which a given technique belongs.5 
This problem is particularly prevalent where multiple scientific 
communities claim a technique as their own. For example, a trial 
judge may first have to determine whether he should be considering 
members of the molecular genetics community, the forensic science 
community, or the statistics community when a party seeks to 
introduce evidence based on DNA fingerprinting techniques. 
In light of these concerns, many scholars urge California 
courts to follow the pattern of widespread state adoption of the 
federal Daubert standard. This test requires judges to act as 
gatekeepers to ensure that expert evidence is not only accepted, 
but also substantively reliable.6 The Daubert standard does this 
by making the acceptance test required under Kelly-Frye just one 
of a number of flexible guidelines that the trial judge may 
consider when reaching his admissibility decision. In addition to 
this familiar prong, other non-exclusive guidelines include: 
(1) whether the technique can be tested; (2) whether the 
technique has been subjected to peer review and publication; and 
(3) the known or potential rate of error and the existence and 
maintenance of standards controlling the technique’s operation.7 
However, this approach presents problems of its own, mostly 
stemming from the simple fact that judges are not scientists, nor 
are they jurors. Since they are not scientists, judges are not 
equipped with the empirical, methodological, and often 
particularized knowledge necessary to determine whether a 
given technique is substantively reliable. Furthermore, judges 
may be infringing upon the province of juries by making these 
determinations. While under any standard, a judge is required to 
 
 4 Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923). 
 5 See generally infra Part II.B. 
 6 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589 (1993). 
 7 Id. at 593–94. 
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determine the admissibility of evidence, it is the function of the 
jury to determine and weigh the credibility of witnesses, which 
the Daubert standard explicitly requires judges to do. 
In light of these standards and the concerns each presents, 
this article considers whether California should retain the 
Kelly-Frye test for the admissibility of novel expert scientific 
evidence, adopt the federal Daubert standard, or implement a 
new method. While no small number of scholars have analyzed 
each standard, and many other articles have advanced new 
approaches to evaluating expert scientific evidence in this or 
other states, ultimately, each of these propositions fails to fully 
address the criticism raised, exacerbates one or more of those 
issues, or creates an entirely new set of concerns.  
This article advocates for the use of an existing program—the 
American Association for the Advancement of Science’s 
Court-Appointed Scientific Experts (“CASE”)—in a novel and 
widespread way.8 Currently, the program experts’ participation 
in expert scientific evidentiary hearings serves as an optional 
resource available to judges at their election. This resource 
should instead be mandated under a new second prong of the 
Kelly-Frye test. This additional prong would require a trial judge 
to consult with a CASE expert before making any decision on the 
admissibility of expert scientific evidence. This approach in no 
way requires the judge to follow the advice of the CASE member, 
leaving the ultimate decision fully in the judge’s hands. Instead, 
this requirement injects the knowledge of an independently 
vetted, unbiased member of the scientific community at the 
pre-trial stage. Involving neutral experts at this stage allows 
the trial judge to gain a deeper understanding of both the 
scientific community’s acceptance or rejection of a given 
technique and its substantive reliability without making scientific 
judgments the judge is likely unqualified to make and 
uncomfortable with making. 
Part II of this article looks into the establishment of 
California’s Kelly-Frye test through a triad of cases—Frye v. United 
States, People v. Kelly, and People v. Leahy—before delving into 
the most prominent criticism the Kelly-Frye test has since faced. 
This is then accompanied by an illustration of what it takes to 
meet the demands of the standard through the history of 
attempts to introduce DNA evidence and its eventual acceptance 
under Kelly-Frye. 
 
 8 Court Appointed Scientific Experts (CASE), AM. ASS’N FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF SCI., 
http://www.aaas.org/page/court-appointed-scientific-experts-case [http://perma.cc/RUU6-6E3E]. 
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Part III explores the federal Daubert test, again taking note of 
the trilogy of cases comprising its background—Daubert v. Merrell 
Dow Pharmaceuticals, General Electric Co. v. Joiner, and Kuhmo Tire 
Co. v. Carmichael. The section then examines the major critiques 
of both its formulation and application that have arisen since its 
inception, and questions whether application in California courts 
would be desirable, or even viable.  
Part IV considers changes that the standards themselves 
may have undergone over the years by scrutinizing a 2012 
California Supreme Court case, Sargon Enterprises Inc. v. Merrell 
Dow Pharmaceuticals. In this case, the court called upon trial 
judges to engage in an inquiry that determines whether a study 
relied upon by an expert is valid as a matter of common sense. 
Prominent commentators have suggested that this case conflates 
the California and Federal standards, arguably reflecting the 
state’s move toward becoming a Daubert jurisdiction.9 They note 
the court’s use of “gatekeeper” language and argue that the 
opinion seems to be framed around the more complex Daubert 
standard rather than the simple Kelly-Frye single-prong test.10 
However, this section ultimately concludes that any similarity 
between Sargon and the Daubert cases has been overstated, and 
that the Kelly-Frye test remains alive and well in California.  
This article concludes with Part V, which begins in section A 
with a discussion of emerging alternatives and modifications to 
each of the current standards that seek to solve or mitigate their 
associated problems. These include the use of artificial intelligence, 
the move to a “substantial acceptance” test, and the adoption of a 
more flexible procedure, rather than the current static tests. 
These suggestions, taken together, make abundantly clear that 
the flaws in the current systems are cause for concern and, 
furthermore, that a solution is not likely to be found through 
stubborn adherence to either of these dated standards. Instead, 
in section B, this article ultimately advocates for the widespread 
incorporation of Court-Appointed Scientific Experts in all 
hearings regarding the admissibility of scientific expert evidence 
in California, and explains how this allows for the substantive 
reliability analysis envisioned by the Daubert court without 
requiring ill-equipped trial judges to make these determinations 
based on scientific knowledge they generally do not possess. 
 
 9 See infra Part IV. 
 10 See id.; Sargon Enter, Inc. v. Univ. of S. Cal., 288 P.3d 1237, 1239–40, 1251 (Cal. 2012). 
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II. CALIFORNIA’S KELLY-FRYE TEST  
A. Three Core Cases Establishing and Strengthening the 
Kelly-Frye Test 
In 1923, the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit decided 
Frye v. United States, which reviewed James Alphonzo Frye’s 
appeal of his conviction for murder in the second degree.11 His 
single point on appeal was the lower court’s denial of the 
admission of expert witness testimony relaying the results of a 
systolic blood pressure deception test, the predecessor to the 
modern polygraph test.12 In affirming the judgment, the appellate 
court held that the evidence was properly excluded at trial because 
such a test was not “sufficiently established to have gained general 
acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs.”13  
The California Supreme Court then formally adopted the 
Frye holding in its 1976 decision, People v. Kelly.14 In reversing 
Robert Kelly’s conviction for extortion, the court held that the 
state had not met its burden of establishing the reliability of the 
novel technique known as “voiceprint”15 by introducing the 
testimony of a single witness whose impartiality was questionable.16 
The court referenced other cases considering the admissibility of 
voiceprint evidence and emphasized that in these cases, the trial 
courts were expected to undergo a “lengthy and comprehensive” 
preliminary hearing on the “general acceptance” issue.17 
From this opinion, a set of guidelines has emerged for 
evaluating the general acceptance of a novel scientific technique.18 
Pursuant to these guidelines, a court should: (1) consider the relevant 
qualifications of testifying experts, in particular whether the 
purported expert is himself a scientist or is instead a technician 
or law enforcement officer;19 (2) be careful not to overvalue the 
testimony of a single witness;20 and (3) be careful not to overvalue 
the testimony of experts too close to the technique to assess it 
 
 11 Frye, 293 F. at 1013. 
 12 Id.  
 13 Id. at 1014. 
 14 People v. Kelly, 549 P.2d 1240, 1244 (Cal. 1976). 
 15 Id. at 1251. 
 16 Id. at 1248–49. 
 17 Commonwealth v. Lykus, 327 N.E.2d 671, 676 (Mass. 1975).  
 18 See MIGUEL A. MENDEZ, EVIDENCE: A CONCISE COMPARISON OF THE FEDERAL 
RULES WITH THE CALIFORNIA CODE 678–79 (2014) (summarizing guidelines and collecting 
cases in which they were established). 
 19 Kelly, 549 P.2d at 1250. 
 20 Id. at 1248; see also State v. Cary, 230 A.2d 384, 389 (N.J. 1967) (“something more 
than the bare opinion of one man, however qualified, is required”). 
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fairly and impartially—especially where an expert is the leading 
proponent of the technique.21 
Almost twenty years later, in People v. Leahy, the California 
Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeal’s reversal of 
William Leahy’s conviction for driving under the influence of 
alcohol.22 Leahy’s conviction had been based on testimony 
relating the results of defendant’s horizontal gaze nystagmus 
field sobriety test.23 In so holding, the court expressly refused to 
follow the new federal Daubert standard,24 and instead 
reaffirmed the use of the Kelly-Frye test.25 Notably, the court also 
clarified that under Kelly, general acceptance is defined as “a 
consensus drawn from a typical cross-section of the relevant, 
qualified scientific community.”26 
B. Major Criticisms of Kelly-Frye and Its Continued Application 
When properly applied, the Kelly-Frye test adds reliability 
and predictability to the admission of expert scientific evidence. 
However, determining the proper application of the test has 
become a widespread problem in and of itself. This key challenge 
can be broken down into the trouble presented by: (1) deciding 
whether the scientific technique at issue is novel and potentially 
misleading, and therefore subject to the test; and (2) defining the 
nature and breadth of the scientific community implicated by 
that evidence. As each of these components is crucial to the 
standard functioning properly, an inability to make these 
determinations consistently undermines the predictability that 
Kelly-Frye was designed to provide. 
1. Is the Scientific Technique at Issue Novel or Established? 
Because the Kelly-Frye test applies only to novel scientific 
techniques,27 it is critical to distinguish “novel” from “established” 
techniques. This is often easier said than done. As the Illinois 
Supreme Court has recognized, “a ‘new’ or ‘novel’ scientific technique 
is not always easy to identify, especially in light of constant scientific 
 
 21 Kelly, 549 P.2d at 1249. 
 22 People v. Leahy, 882 P.2d 321 (Cal. 1994) (determining the admissibility of 
evidence based on this then-new field sobriety test, which purports to test a subject’s 
intoxication based on involuntary eye movements caused by the inability of his eyes to 
maintain visual fixation as they are turned from side to side). 
 23 Id. 
 24 See generally infra Part III. 
 25 Leahy, 882 P. 2d at 331. 
 26 Id. at 337. 
 27 See, e.g., People v. Webb, 862 P.2d 779, 798 (Cal. 1993); People v. Stoll, 783 P.2d 
698, 710 (Cal. 1989); Kelly, 549 P.2d at 1244. 
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advances in our modern era.”28 As scientific methodologies, studies, 
and communities advance at rapid paces, it becomes increasingly 
difficult to determine on which side of the novelty line a given 
technique falls, particularly for those outside of the relevant 
scientific communities. 
This problem is in some ways alleviated by the guidance 
provided in additional case law following the landmark decisions 
discussed above. In People v. Stoll, the court acknowledged that 
the rule did not provide a clear definition of a “new scientific 
technique,” but identified two prominent themes that have emerged 
from the application of the test.29 The first is that Kelly-Frye only 
applies to “that limited class of expert testimony which is based, 
in whole or part, on a technique, process, or theory which is new 
to science and, even more so, the law.”30 The court stated that a 
key factor in determining a technique’s novelty for Kelly-Frye 
purposes is “repeated use, study, testing and confirmation by 
scientists or trained technicians.”31 
The second theme is that the test only applies to those 
techniques that carry a “misleading aura of scientific infallibility” 
that leaves the jury effectively blindsided by the testimony.32 
This potential for a misled jury, one of the primary motivations 
for the Frye court’s initial adoption of a conservative approach to 
admissibility, is just as strong today as it was in 1989. For 
example, a 2010 study found that a random sample of 1201 
potential California jurors ranked “science-based” evidence an 
average of almost three times more reliable than police, victim, 
or eyewitness testimony.33 
Finally, the court in People v. McDonald noted, without 
explanation for the distinction, that Kelly-Frye has never been 
applied to expert medical testimony.34 Subsequent cases have 
 
 28 Donaldson v. Cent. Ill. Pub. Serv. Co., 767 N.E.2d 314, 325 (Ill. 2002). 
 29 Stoll, 783 P.2d at 710. 
 30 Id. 
 31 Leahy, 882 P.2d at 606 (Cal. 1994) (noting that this factor would be more 
significant in determining whether a technique was “new” than long-standing use by 
police officers). 
 32 Stoll, 783 P.2d at 710–11; see also Huntingdon v. Crowley, 414 P.2d 382, 390 (Cal. 1966). 
 33 Deborah R. Baskin & Ira B. Sommers, Crime-Show-Viewing Habits and Public 
Attitudes Toward Forensic Evidence: The “CSI Effect” Revisited, 31 JUST. SYS. J. 97, 102–
03 (2010). The study used data collected by the Field Research Corporation’s survey of 
California’s registered voters. The sample group was contacted by telephone and 
instructed to use a reverse-coded four-point scale to rank various types of evidence from 
four, indicating “not at all reliable,” to one, indicating “extremely reliable.” Collectively, 
the scientific types of evidence received an average 1.18 rating while the testimony types 
averaged a 3.07 rating. Id. 
 34 People v. McDonald, 690 P.2d 709, 724 (Cal. 1984). But see In re Lockheed 
Litigation Cases, 192 P.3d 403 (Cal. 2007), in which the California Supreme Court 
certified the issue of the scope of a trial court’s power to evaluate medical opinion 
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echoed this proposition,35 further narrowing the scope of 
techniques that must be evaluated for their novelty. These 
considerations ameliorate concerns about the difficulty of 
distinguishing novel from established scientific techniques in 
many cases, but the concepts themselves still must be applied in 
rapidly advancing areas that may not always fit nicely onto 
either side of this dividing line.  
2. Which Scientific Field Applies? 
Once it has been determined that the test should, in fact, be 
applied, a new obstacle arises in determining the “relevant” 
scientific community implicated by the purported evidence. The 
choice is not always self-evident, leading some trial courts to rely 
on “meta-experts”—groups of individuals from a variety of 
disciplines who, in turn, evaluate the validity of the claims made 
by other experts.36 These groups must attempt to find some 
“rational, empirical standpoint” from which to judge the claims.37 
In this way, the court’s inability to identify which scientific 
community may be the most relevant to the proffered evidence 
can, in stark contrast to the test’s goals, serve to remove that 
community entirely from the validity determination. 
Selection of the appropriate field may not only prove 
troublesome to a court, but may also be dispositive of the case, 
making this particular problem far more important than it is 
tricky.38 Certain scientific communities may readily accept a new 
technique based not on its validity, but rather on its furtherance 
of the community’s overall objectives.39 On the other hand, more 
conservative scientific communities may be biased against 
association with any technique seen as radical, regardless of 
 
testimony but later withdrew its grant of certiorari, citing conflicts of interest for a 
majority of the justices. This decision resulted in a lack of guidance on the proper 
standard for admission of expert medical testimony. See CYNTHIA H. CWIK & CLIFTON T. 
HUTCHINSON, SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE REVIEW: ADMISSIBILITY AND USE OF EXPERT 
EVIDENCE IN THE COURTROOM, MONOGRAPH NO. 8 507–08 (2008). 
 35 See, e.g., People v. Ward, 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d 828, 831 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999); People v. 
Mendibles, 245 Cal. Rptr. 553, 562 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988). 
 36 Simon A. Cole, Out of the Daubert Fire and into the Fryeing Pan? Self-Validation, 
Meta-Expertise and the Admissibility of Latent Print Evidence in Frye Jurisdictions, 9 
MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 453, 456–58 (2008). 
 37 Id. 
 38 See Paul C. Giannelli, The Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v. 
United States, a Half Century Later, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1197, 1208 (1980); see also United 
States v. Williams, 583 F.2d 1194, 1198 (2d Cir. 1978) (“Selection of the ‘relevant 
scientific community,’ appears to influence the result.”). 
 39 See Andre A. Moenssens, Requiem for the “General Acceptance” Standard in 
Forensic Science – Some Whimsical Thoughts on the Battle of Frye v. The Federal Rules of 
Evidence, in 1982 LEGAL MED. ANN. 275, 276 (C. Wecht ed., 1982). 
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whether it is supported by reliable underlying methodology.40 Modern 
techniques can further exacerbate this problem by implicating 
elements of a variety of disciplines, especially where no single 
community “claim[s] the novel process as its own.”41 
A subset of this conundrum is determining the breadth of a 
given community. If too broad a field is selected, many members 
of that wide community may not even be aware of the particular 
method being employed by a subset of its scientists.42 However, if 
too narrow a field is chosen, “the judgment of the scientific 
community becomes, in reality, the opinion of a few experts.”43 
The difficulty of this choice was illustrated in People v. Quintanilla 
where, after much debate, the court found that the relevant 
community for the DNA method upon which the prosecution’s 
expert sought to base his testimony, polymerase chain reaction, 
was not limited to forensics, but rather extended to the entire 
scientific community employing that method.44 
C. DNA Fingerprinting Evidence and the Extensive Process It 
Underwent to Rise to the Level of General Acceptance 
Many of these problems can be best illustrated by a look into 
the process that deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) fingerprinting45 
evidence underwent to reach the level of general acceptance 
required by the test. Before 1989, DNA fingerprinting went 
“essentially unchallenged”46 in the United States, despite its 
introduction in at least eighty murder and rape trials alone.47 
During that time, one judge referred to the evidence as “the 
single greatest advance in the ‘search for truth’ . . . since the 
 
 40 See id. 
 41 See Andre A. Moenssens, Admissibility of Scientific Evidence–An Alternative to the 
Frye Rule, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 545, 548 (1984); see also DAVID L. FAIGMAN, DAVID H. 
KAYE, MICHAEL J. SAKS & JOSEPH SANDERS, SCIENCE IN THE LAW: FORENSIC SCIENCE 
ISSUES § 11-2.7.4 (2002) (dedicating an entire section to determining what the relevant 
scientific community for a given piece of DNA evidence might be, with conclusions 
including: molecular genetics, biotechnology, biology, statistics, population genetics, and 
forensic science). 
 42 See, e.g., People v. Williams, 331 P.2d 251, 253–54 (Cal. App. Dep’t Super. Ct. 
1958) (finding that because the “medical profession generally [was] unfamiliar with the 
use of Nalline” the test could not have satisfied Frye if the entirety of the medical 
profession were the relevant scientific community). 
 43 Giannelli, supra note 38, at 1209–10. 
 44 People v. Quintanilla, No. C-23691 (San Mateo County Super. Ct. Aug. 16, 1991). 
This community is made up of scientists in the fields of human genetics, molecular 
biology, biochemistry, population genetics, and demographics. Id. 
 45 See People v. Axell, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 411, 415–18 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991) for an 
explanation of the science underlying DNA and the technique of DNA fingerprinting. 
 46 Leonard J. Deftos, Daubert & Frye: Compounding the Controversy Over the 
Forensic Use of DNA Testing, 15 WHITTIER L. REV. 955 (1994). 
 47 Jerry E. Bishop, Reliability of DNA ‘Fingerprinting’ Challenged in New York 
Murder Case, WALL ST. J., May 22, 1989, at B4. 
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advent of cross-examination.”48 Later that year, however, the 
evidence faced its “first serious legal challenge” in a New York 
case, People v. Castro,49 with several experts testifying for the 
first time in a pretrial hearing on the reliability of the test’s 
procedures and interpretation.50 A statement was eventually 
issued by both parties who came to the out-of-court agreement 
that if the data were subjected to peer review, “it would not be 
accepted”51 and the evidence was subsequently excluded.52 Three 
years later, the court in People v. Barney53 specifically cited a 
report by the National Research Council, which recommended 
that a pro-defendant mathematical formula be used at trial until 
there was an improvement of technical procedures to improve the 
forensic value of the method,54 as “indicative of a lack of general 
acceptance for the current statistical methods of interpreting 
DNA data.”55 Though fear, spurred by its potential failure to 
measure up to the Kelly-Frye general acceptance standard, 
triggered an increase in challenges,56 by 1996, the admissibility 
of DNA fingerprinting evidence had been upheld by twenty-eight 
state supreme courts.57 This shift was due in part to a 
subsequent finding by a National Academy of Sciences panel that 
the usual methodology was sound.58 Though each new method of 
analyzing the data brings new Kelly-Frye challenges, many of the 
more commonly used methods have now been determined by the 
courts to carry general acceptance.59  
This history demonstrates how the specific scientific 
community, when considered and consulted in evaluating novel 
scientific evidence, can dramatically shift the level of acceptance. 
The early evaluations reflected a community eagerly embracing 
the technique, but this focus was tilted when the first National 
Research Council report cast doubt on acceptance by a wider 
 
 48 People v. Wesley, 533 N.Y.S.2d 643, 644 (Albany Cnty. Ct. 1988). 
 49 People v. Castro, 545 N.Y.S.2d 985, 986 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1989). 
 50 Id.; see also Alison Priske Adema, Comment, DNA Fingerprinting Evidence: The 
Road to Admissibility in California, 26 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 377, 388–89 (1989). 
 51 Harold M. Schmeck, Jr., DNA Findings Are Disputed by Scientists, N.Y. TIMES, 
May 25, 1989, at B1, B12. 
 52 Deftos, supra note 46, at 956. 
 53 People v. Barney, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 731, 738–39 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992). 
 54 See generally NAT’L RES. COUNCIL, DNA TECHNOLOGY IN FORENSIC SCIENCE (1992). 
 55 Deftos, supra note 46, at 964–65. But see John McCabe, DNA Fingerprinting: The 
Failings of Frye, 16 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 455, 461–62 (1996) (arguing that Kelly-Frye was 
extended to the statistical interpretation of the DNA data in this case based only on a 
faulty analogy and bare policy considerations). 
 56 See McCabe, supra note 55, at 461–62. See generally DAVID H. KAYE, THE DOUBLE 
HELIX AND THE LAW OF EVIDENCE (2010). 
 57 See McCabe, supra note 55, at 455 n.3 (collecting cases). 
 58 See FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 41, at 671; NAT’L RES. COUNCIL, THE EVALUATION 
OF FORENSIC DNA EVIDENCE 36 (1996). 
 59 See FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 41, at 669–73. 
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community. In this case, the issue was ultimately resolved within 
the institution itself, lending further support to the argument 
that the Kelly-Frye test places these decisions in the right hands 
by allowing scientific communities to apply their own best 
practices for vetting the validity of novel techniques over time.60  
III. THE FEDERAL DAUBERT STANDARD 
A. The Three Key Cases of the “Daubert Trilogy”61 
In 1993, Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. 
brought before the United States Supreme Court the issue of 
determining the standard for the admissibility of scientific expert 
evidence in federal court.62 The Court first noted the recent 
increase in criticism of the Kelly-Frye test based on difficulties 
with determining the proper scope and application of the test 
relative to different types of evidence and different scientific 
communities. It then held that it need not weigh in on that 
debate because the test had been superseded by the 1975 
adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence.63  
The Court found that the rigid general acceptance test would 
be at odds with the “liberal thrust” of the Federal Rules’ “general 
approach of relaxing the traditional barriers to ‘opinion’ testimony.”64 
The Court then interpreted Rule 702 to require that scientific expert 
evidence must be “not only relevant, but reliable.”65 Ensuring that 
these requirements were met would require a trial judge to act as a 
“gatekeeper” in screening an expert’s testimony to determine the 
reliability of the scientific methodology and reasoning underlying his 
opinion.66 In doing so, the judge must determine whether the evidence 
is supported by scientifically valid reasoning or methodology.67  
While this inquiry can implicate a number of factors, the 
opinion also sets forth “flexible,”68 non-exclusive guidelines for trial 
judges to apply in assessing the validity of a scientific technique: 
(1) whether it can be, or has been, tested;69 (2) whether it has been 
 
 60 See generally supra Part II.B. 
 61 Margaret Berger, The Supreme Court’s Trilogy on the Admissibility of Expert 
Testimony, in REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE (2d ed. 2000). 
 62 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 585 (1993). 
 63 Id. at 586, 589; see also BRUCE D. SALES & DANIEL W. SHUMAN, EXPERTS IN 
COURT: RECONCILING LAW, SCIENCE, AND PROFESSIONAL KNOWLEDGE 31 (2005) (finding it 
curious that the Federal Rules made no mention of Frye). 
 64 Id. at 588 (quoting Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153, 169 (1998)). 
 65 FED. R. EVID. 702; Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589. 
 66 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589 n.7. 
 67 Id. at 591–92. 
 68 Id. at 594. 
 69 Id. at 593. 
Do Not Delete 7/11/17 8:06 PM 
404 Chapman Law Review [Vol. 20:2 
subjected to peer review and publication;70 (3) the known or potential 
rate of error and the existence and maintenance of standards 
controlling the technique’s operation;71 and finally, (4) whether it has 
attained general acceptance in the relevant scientific community.72 
Rather than displacing the Kelly-Frye test entirely, the Supreme Court 
chose to list it as one among several factors to be considered in 
making the determination.73 Because a trial judge is armed with 
several more substantive factors that may overcome a deficiency 
revealed at the “bean-counting” stage, this more expansive test 
can be more liberally applied to admit evidence that a Kelly-Frye 
court would be forced to exclude. 
Just four years later, the United State Supreme Court had 
the occasion to clarify a number of key Daubert issues in General 
Electric Co. v. Joiner.74 First, the Court held that a trial judge’s 
decision to admit or exclude scientific evidence under the Daubert 
test is to be reviewed under the standard of abuse of discretion, such 
that it will not be overturned unless it is “manifestly erroneous.”75 
This standard gives great deference to a trial court’s admissibility 
decision. The Court then held that the district court judge had 
not abused her discretion in excluding scientific expert testimony 
and reiterated that the focus under Daubert is on methodology 
and techniques employed by the expert, not on the ultimate 
conclusion he reaches.76 However, the Court acknowledged that 
“conclusions and methodology are not entirely distinct from one 
another,” and as such, a trial judge may properly exclude the 
evidence where there are significant analytical gaps between an 
expert’s methodology and his proffered opinion.77 
Most recently, Kuhmo Tire Co. v. Carmichael established 
that Daubert’s gatekeeping obligation is not limited to scientific 
 
 70 Id. (noting that while publication does not guarantee validity, it remains a 
relevant consideration in that by subjecting the work to scrutiny of other experts in the 
field it becomes more probable that problems or inconsistencies would have been 
discovered and subject to commentary). 
 71 Id. at 594; see KENNETH R. FOSTER & PETER W. HUBER, JUDGING SCIENCE: 
SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE AND THE FEDERAL COURTS 69 (1997) (“Errors can affect either the 
reliability of a measurement . . . or its validity . . . .”). 
 72 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594. 
 73 DAVID H. KAYE, DAVID E. BERNSTEIN, & JENNIFER L. MNOOKIN, THE NEW 
WIGMORE: A TREATISE OF EVIDENCE - EXPERT EVIDENCE 327–29 (2d ed. 2011) (“General 
acceptance, in other words, is relevant to the admissibility of scientific evidence because it 
is circumstantial evidence of validity.”). 
 74 See generally Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997). 
 75 Id. at 142 (quoting Spring Co. v. Edgar, 99 U.S. 645, 658 (1879)). 
 76 Id. at 146; see also Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595 (“The focus, of course, must be solely 
on principles and methodology, not on the conclusions that they generate.”). 
 77 Joiner, 522 U.S. at 146. 
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testimony, but rather, extends to expert testimony of any kind.78 
The Court based this finding on the language of Federal Rule of 
Evidence 702 that “[i]f scientific, technical, or other specialized 
knowledge will assist the trier of fact . . . , a witness qualified as 
an expert . . . may testify thereto in the form of an opinion,” 
noting that the statute makes no distinction between the 
differing categories of knowledge.79 In addition, the Court 
reiterated that the guidelines established in Daubert are flexible 
aids, rather than a “definitive checklist.”80 In any given case, the 
court may, but need not necessarily, give consideration to those 
factors that are reasonable reliability measures in the context of 
the issue, the particular area of expertise, and the subject matter 
of the expert’s testimony.81 The combination of the guidelines’ 
flexibility and the limited review under the abuse of discretion 
standard results in a trial court’s wide latitude in choosing to 
admit or deny scientific evidence.82 
B. Prominent Criticism of the Daubert Standard 
Just as there was significant opposition to the Kelly-Frye 
formulation, the Daubert test has not been immune to criticism 
of its own. Critics have long expressed doubt about the confidence 
with which the court in Daubert stated that “federal judges possess 
the capacity to undertake this review,”83 noting that there is little 
to no basis for believing judges are equipped with the scientific 
understanding to do so. Furthermore, many scholars argue that even 
if we were to assume that judges possessed the knowledge to make 
these decisions, by doing so they would be usurping determinations 
properly made by the jury.84 
1. Judges Are Not Scientists 
At the time the Daubert decision was handed down, its earliest 
critique was that judges were not and are not scientists by profession 
and that our evidence standards should not require them to be. 
Writing for himself and Justice Stevens, Chief Justice Rehnquist 
delivered Daubert’s dissenting opinion cautioning the Court that it 
had gone too far,85 and stated, “I do not doubt that Rule 702 confides 
 
 78 Kuhmo Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 141 (1999). In this product liability 
action, the expert in question was an engineer. Id. 
 79 Kuhmo Tire, 526 U.S. at 147; see FED. R. EVID. 702. 
 80 Kuhmo Tire, 526 U.S. at 150 (quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593). 
 81 Id. at 141. 
 82 For example, the Eleventh Circuit has applied this standard in affirming “the 
lower courts’ Daubert rulings in over 70% of published cases since the beginning of this 
decade.” W. RANDALL BASSETT, ET AL., Evidence, 67 MERCER L. REV. 907, 915 (2016). 
 83 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593. 
 84 See infra, Part II.B.2. 
 85 Id. at 598 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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to the judge some gatekeeping responsibility . . . but I do not think 
it imposes on them either the obligation or the authority to 
become amateur scientists.”86 Scholars have echoed these same 
concerns. For example, Professor Rebecca Harris has argued that 
judges and scientists are “two very different creatures.”87 As evidence 
of this proposition, she distinguishes between the neutrality and 
authority that are the hallmarks of the judicial role, and the 
precision and sterility that comprise the “scientific reputation.”88 
She notes that these two very different worlds are forced to collide 
when judges, as gatekeepers, must “determine which scientific 
‘strangers’ shall be admitted into the halls of justice.”89 
Similar concerns are also raised by proponents of the Kelly-Frye 
method, who point out that “the requirement of general 
acceptance in the scientific community assures that those most 
qualified to assess the general validity of a scientific method will 
have the determinative voice.”90 Professor David Faigman argues 
that judges “have little training in, knowledge of, or inclination to 
learn science,” but in the twenty-first century, Daubert has made 
it a job requirement that judges become amateur scientists.91 In 
fact, an extensive survey of studies found that “judges may be no 
better than laypeople in identifying flawed or questionable expert 
methodologies.”92 By requiring trial judges, generally untrained 
in science of any kind, to determine the reliability of the 
particular scientific issues before them, we are taking that 
determinative voice out of the hands of the far more qualified 
scientific community. 
 In addition, Professors Caudill and LaRue argue that even 
if judges had an understanding of the scientific methodologies on 
which they were ruling, this knowledge would not be enough.93 
Instead, a number of reversals of Daubert decisions on appeal 
reveal that judges need to know about the social, institutional, 
and rhetorical aspects of science as well.94 In light of the review 
 
 86 Id. at 600–01. 
 87 REBECCA C. HARRIS, BLACK ROBES, WHITE COATS: THE PUZZLE OF JUDICIAL 
POLICYMAKING AND SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 1 (2008). 
 88 Id. 
 89 Id. at 7. 
 90 United States v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741, 743–44 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (emphasis added); 
see also NAT’L RES. COUNCIL, supra note 2, at 11 (“Scientists, nevertheless, generally 
recognize the limits of their methods and have developed best practices for addressing 
them . . . .”). 
 91 David L. Faigman, Judges as “Amateur Scientists,” 86 B.U. L. REV. 1207, 1207–09 (2006). 
 92 Marta M. Chlistunoff, Expert Testimony and the Quest for Reliability: The Case for 
a Methodology Questionnaire, 94 TEX. L. REV. 1055, 1061 (2016). 
 93 See David S. Caudill & Lewis H. LaRue, Why Judges Applying the Daubert Trilogy 
Need to Know About the Social, Institutional, and Rhetorical – And Not Just the 
Methodological – Aspects of Science, 45 B.C. L. REV. 1, 51–52 (2003). 
 94 Id. at 1. 
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of these determinations under the relatively lax abuse of discretion 
standard, these reversals indicate serious problems underpinning 
the lower courts’ admissions.  
Professor Sheila Jasanoff has identified six characteristics of 
scientific knowledge of which judges need to be aware when 
making admissibility determinations: (1) social construction; 
(2) contingency; (3) inscription; (4) deconstruction; (5) experimenters’ 
regress; and (6) boundary work.95 The first of these characteristics, 
social construction, reflects the view that facts presented by 
scientists are socially constructed “by human agency through the 
institutions and processes of science” rather than direct 
reflections of nature.96 The contingency characteristic means that 
scientific claims are dependent upon background features 
through which they are produced, like the experimental 
conventions within the relevant scientific community.97 Inscription 
is the process by which science is transformed into written 
texts.98 The fourth characteristic, deconstruction, is the process by 
which the socially constructed scientific facts become untangled 
from their personal components during a controversy, particularly 
during adversarial litigation processes.99 Experimenters’ regress 
is a name given to the common pattern of deconstruction whereby 
claims are only tested so long as scientists remain motivated to 
challenge one another. Once these motivations cease, a consensus 
is said to form and such “black boxed” claims find themselves at 
the core of scientific knowledge.100 Finally, boundary work is the 
tendency of a scientific community to resist criticism from 
outsiders in order to maintain the stability of its findings.101  
Though Professor Jasanoff’s additional knowledge requirements 
vary from those presented by Professors Caudill and LaRue, each of 
these scholarly writings makes clear that some deeper understanding 
of science on the part of the judiciary is necessary. Only with this 
added knowledge can a trial judge appreciate the scientific field’s 
goals and limitations while avoiding a conflation of authority for 
reliability that leads to the idealization of science rather than a 
decision grounded in scientific reality.102 
 
 95 See Sheila Jasanoff, What Judges Should Know About the Sociology of Science, 77 
JUDICATURE 77, 77–78 (1993). 
 96 Id. at 77; see also FOSTER & HUBER, supra note 71, at 195. 
 97 See Jasanoff, supra note 95, at 78. 
 98 Id. 
 99 Id.  
 100 Id. 
 101 Id.; see also Sheila Jasanoff, Watching the Watchers: Lessons from the Science of 
Science Advice, THE GUARDIAN (Apr. 8, 2013, 7:30 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/science/ 
political-science/2013/apr/08/lessons-science-advice [http://perma.cc/UL6T-X6TV]. 
 102 See Caudill & LaRue, supra note 93, at 5. 
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Perhaps most tellingly, concerns about judges’ limited 
scientific knowledge have emerged from trial judges themselves. 
In State v. Cauthron, the court admitted that it “lack[ed] the 
scientific expertise to either assess or explain the methodology” 
on which it was asked to.103 In Craig v. Boren, Justice Brennan 
proclaimed it “unrealistic to expect . . . members of the judiciary . . . to 
be well versed in the rigors of experimental or statistical technique.”104 
In United States v. Cline, Senior District Judge Crow admitted 
“those of a ‘scientific’ bent certainly can take issue with whether 
the judges and lawyers have the education or training to engage 
in ‘scientific’ testing.”105 In a 2001 survey of 400 state court judges 
in jurisdictions applying both Frye and Daubert, about half admitted 
that they were not adequately prepared to evaluate the range of 
scientific evidence proffered in their courtrooms.106 These admissions 
and results make abundantly clear that trial judges are anything 
but comfortable with the scientific role the Daubert rule has thrust 
upon them. 
Further argument against this trend is found in the 
discussion records of the National Research Council of the National 
Academies’ Committee on Daubert Standards. The Committee noted 
the striking cultural differences between science and the law, 
particularly in the system of values for which each discipline 
strives.107 On the one hand, science values precision and accuracy, 
which take time, with research and testing often extending over a 
period of years and relying on the collaboration of many scientists 
and technicians to achieve these goals. In stark contrast, the law 
values “pragmatic justice at a particular point in time so that people 
can get on with their lives.”108 Moreover, the law attempts to 
resolve questions in an adversarial setting.109 These differences 
may help explain why qualified, academic scientists are often 
hesitant to testify as expert witnesses,110 and why lawyers and 
judges should not be required to act as amateur scientists. 
 
 103 State v. Cauthron, 846 P.2d 502, 517 (Wash. 1993). 
 104 Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 204 (1976). 
 105 U.S. v. Cline, 188 F. Supp. 2d 1287, 1294 (D. Kan. 2002). 
 106 Sophia I. Gatowski et al., Asking the Gatekeepers: A National Survey of Judges on 
Judging Expert Evidence in a Post-Daubert World, 25 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 433, 441–
442 (2001). 
 107 NAT’L RES. COUNCIL, supra note 2, at 17; see also SALES & SHUMAN, supra note 63, 
at 38; FOSTER & HUBER, supra note 71, at 17–19. 
 108 Mark S. Frankel, The Evolving Role of Scientific Experts in the Courts, 1 J. OF 
PHIL., SCI. & L. (2001), https://jpsl.org/archives/evolving-role-scientific-experts-courts/ [http:// 
perma.cc/498S-9XPM]. 
 109 NAT’L RES. COUNCIL, supra note 2, at 17. 
 110 Id. at 18. 
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2. The Gatekeeping Role May Infringe on the Jury 
Even assuming judges are qualified to make these scientific 
determinations, critics argue that doing so improperly infringes 
on the province of the jury111 to make determinations about the 
credibility of witnesses.112 The nation’s most cited Evidence law 
scholar,113 Edward J. Imwinkelreid, asserts that the language in 
the Daubert opinion limiting the trial judge’s inquiry to the 
methodology, rather than the conclusion it generates, acknowledges 
this concern about taking evidence from the jury.114 He worries that 
in the modern era of expanded expert testimony, “[t]he fundamental 
issue is the allocation of factfinding power between the trial judge 
and jury.”115 Under Daubert, the trial judge is explicitly asked to 
evaluate the credibility of the experts on either side of the scientific 
argument, impermissibly taking this power away from the jury. 
One such critic, Krista M. Pikus, vigorously argues that it should 
be entirely within the role of the jury to decide the reliability of 
expert testimony because such a determination “primarily entails 
questions of fact.”116 She goes on to assert that taking these questions 
of fact from the jury upsets the balance of power in a world where 
increasingly fewer issues are left to juries.117 For these reasons, 
she supports the guidelines established by the Daubert Court, but 
believes that it is the jury, not the judge, who should be acting as 
the gatekeeper by applying these factors.118 While this approach 
eliminates concerns about infringing on the jury, it raises an 
entirely new set of concerns because, much like trial judges, jurors 
are not scientists. Therefore, the scientific community is still not being 
given a powerful voice in decisions it is most qualified to make. 
 
 111 See id. at 9–10 (“Several concerns have been raised about the courts handling of 
scientific evidence and expertise, in particular . . . [w]hether judges, by excluding too 
much evidence, are intruding on the constitutional role of the jury to resolve disputed facts.”). 
 112 See, e.g., Sparf v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 89 (1895) (noting that questions of 
fact belong to the jury, while it is questions of law that a judge is to decide); see also 
United States v. Brown, 511 F.2d 920, 924 (2d Cir. 1975) (finding that it is the jury’s role 
to judge the credibility of witnesses). 
 113 Brian Leiter, Most Cited Law Professors by Specialty, 2000-2007, BRIAN LEITER’S 
LAW SCHOOL RANKINGS (Dec. 18, 2007), http://www.leiterrankings.com/faculty/2007faculty_ 
impact_areas.shtml#Evidence [http://perma.cc/PHW3-9GVXI]. 
 114 See Edward J. Imwinkelreid, Trial Judges – Gatekeepers or Usurpers? Can the 
Trial Judge Critically Assess the Admissibility of Expert Evidence Without Invading the 
Jury’s Province to Evaluate the Credibility and Weight of the Testimony?, 84 MARQ. L. 
REV. 1, 4–5 (2000). 
 115 Id. at 6–7. 
 116 Krista M. Pikus, Note, We the People: Juries, Not Judges, Should Be the 
Gatekeepers of Expert Evidence, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 453, 455 (2014). 
 117 Id. at 460–61 (discussing the impact of arbitration agreements, settlements, and 
waiver of jury trials, and how they are further impacted by Daubert-style decision-making). 
 118 See id. at 474. 
Do Not Delete 7/11/17 8:06 PM 
410 Chapman Law Review [Vol. 20:2 
IV. BRIDGING THE GAP: SARGON ENTERPRISES INC. V. 
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA 
Before examining the proposed changes to the existing standards, 
it is useful to look into how the Kelly-Frye and Daubert standards 
themselves have changed over the years, and how some scholars 
argue they may no longer be as distinct from each other as 
originally thought.119 As discussed below, that argument is 
somewhat overstated. 
In 2012, the California Supreme Court decided Sargon 
Enterprises Inc. v. University of Southern California,120 a breach 
of contract suit brought against the university by a dental 
implant manufacturer. The court upheld a trial judge’s exclusion 
after an eight-day evidentiary hearing of expert evidence 
regarding lost profits as improperly supported.121 The rejected 
testimony rested on a “market share” approach,122 under which 
the expert declared the small company would have become 
“extraordinarily successful” had the university completed the 
five-year clinical study for which it had contracted.123 Under this 
approach, to calculate Sargon’s lost profits, the expert relied not 
on any of the company’s previously realized profits, but on the 
market’s “Big Six” leaders’ profits.124 Notably, the court held that 
the trial court had not erred in excluding the testimony because 
the “trial court has the duty to act as a ‘gatekeeper’ to exclude 
speculative expert testimony.”125 
David L. Faigman and Edward J. Imwinkelreid, the authors 
on whose previous article the Sargon opinion repeatedly relied,126 
proclaim this case to be “arguably the most important expert 
testimony decision that [the California Supreme Court] has 
rendered in at least two decades.”127 The pair goes on to argue 
that while the decision marks California’s move closer to the 
 
 119 See, e.g., David E. Bernstein, Frye, Frye, Again: The Past, Present, and Future of 
the General Acceptance Test, 41 JURIMETRICS J. 385, 388–89 (2001) (arguing that “case 
law under Frye is slowly converging with Daubert jurisprudence”). 
 120 Sargon Enter, Inc. v. Univ. of S. Cal., 288 P.3d 1237 (Cal. 2012). 
 121 Id. at 1239–40. 
 122 The expert testified that he selected this approach because “the methodology had been 
used in complicated patent cases, antitrust cases, and unfair competition cases.” Id. at 1241. 
 123 Id. at 1239.  
 124 Id. at 1243. The expert certified public accountant, James Skorheim, testified that 
Sargon’s lost profits “ranged from $220 million to $1.18 billion” based almost entirely on 
his opinion that the innovative product would have allowed the company to quickly 
command a significant market share. Id. 
 125 Id. at 1239. 
 126 See Sargon, 288 P.3d at 1251–52. 
 127 David L. Faigman & Edward J. Imwinkelreid, Wading Into the Daubert Tide: 
Sargon Enterprises, Inc. v. University of Southern California, 64 HASTINGS L.J. 1665, 
1665 (2013). 
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Daubert standard, the extent of that move is not yet clear.128 The 
authors note that the Sargon opinion is framed around Daubert129 
and yet also “formally reiterated California’s commitment to 
Frye.”130 The authors venture that because the two tests are not 
mutually exclusive, in fact noting that general acceptance 
remains one factor to be considered under Daubert, “the two tests 
may exist side by side in California courts.”131  
Finally, Faigman and Imwinkelreid conclude that although 
the case marks a “major stride” toward Daubert’s test, there are 
still “significant differences” between applications of the two 
tests, even after this case.132 While the court in Sargon paid 
homage to Daubert, it did not go as far as expressly adopting the 
procedures or factors established by the federal test.133 The 
Sargon opinion requires only that a trial judge engage in an 
inquiry that determines whether, “as a matter of logic,” the 
expert’s cited studies support a finding that the underlying 
theory or technique is valid.134 This remains a far cry from 
Daubert’s requirement that the judge weigh the testimony 
offered by both sides, taking into consideration, if the judge 
wishes, the credibility of the witnesses, and make a reliability 
determination by a preponderance of the evidence.135 
All of this makes clear that despite what some commentators 
believe, California remains just as much a Kelly-Frye jurisdiction 
as it was before the Sargon opinion was announced. While the 
Sargon court did employ Daubert’s “gatekeeper” language, it did 
so only in regard to excluding “unduly speculative” evidence, 
making no mention of an entire inquiry into the evidence’s 
reliability.136 Rather than reflecting a jump toward Daubert-style 
gatekeeping, the opinion merely reflects that such speculative 
evidence is not the type reasonably relied upon by experts in the 
relevant scientific community.137 If there remained any doubt as 
to the true alignment of the court’s test, a critical footnote in 
 
 128 Id. 
 129 In addition to the “gatekeeper” language, the opinion cites with approval all three 
cases that make up the Daubert trilogy. See, e.g., Sargon, 283 P.3d at 722. 
 130 Faigman & Imwinkelreid, supra note 127, at 1669–70. 
 131 Id. at 1689–90. 
 132 Id. at 1670. 
 133 Id. at 1690. 
 134 Sargon, 288 P.3d at 1252 (quoting Edward J. Imwinkelreid & David L. Faigman, 
Evidence Code Section 802: The Neglected Key to Rationalizing the Law of Expert 
Testimony, 42 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 427, 449 (2009)). 
 135 Faigman & Imwinkelreid, supra note 127, at 1691. 
 136 Sargon, 288 P.3d at 1240. In particular, the court noted “[u]nder Evidence Code 
section 801, the trial court acts as a gatekeeper to exclude speculative or irrelevant expert 
opinion.” Id. at 1251 (emphasis added). 
 137 CAL. EVID. CODE § 801(b). 
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Sargon concludes “nothing we say in this case affects our holding 
in Leahy regarding new scientific techniques.”138 The Sargon opinion 
may don Daubert’s terminology in announcing a gatekeeping role 
for California trial judges, but the test itself has not been given 
such a cloak and Kelly-Frye remains just as much the standard in 
California as it was before this case.  
V. EMERGING METHODS 
Given the problems created by each of the tests, it is hardly 
difficult to argue that it is time for a change. In fact, several 
scholars have suggested new methods, ranging from acknowledging 
the acceptance of a recognized minority of the scientific community 
to the introduction of “expert robots.”  
A. Innovative Proposals Advanced by Scholars  
Arguing that the general acceptance standard under Kelly-Frye 
excludes too much valid evidence, scholars and courts alike have 
argued there is no need for universal or even majority acceptance 
and instead set forth a substantial, rather than general, acceptance 
standard.139 Leading Evidence professor Michael H. Graham explains: 
“The difference between the ‘general acceptance test’ and the 
‘substantial acceptance test’ is that while general acceptance 
implies acceptance by a majority if not a significant majority of 
those experts in the particular field, the substantial acceptance 
clearly permits admissibility when acceptance is by a recognized 
minority segment.”140 
Similarly, the court in United States v. Torniero recognized that 
unanimity is rare and instead required only that the lower court 
“make a discretionary determination that the hypotheses relied 
upon have substantial acceptance in the discipline . . . .”141 The 
court first made this explanation in light of the admissibility of 
mental health diagnoses which are not covered by the Kelly-Frye 
standard, but the language it employed has also been applied in the 
context of novel scientific evidence. In State v. Hennum, the court 
echoed Torniero in finding that battered woman syndrome had “gained 
a substantial enough scientific acceptance to warrant admissibility.”142  
 
 138 Sargon, 288 P.3d at 1252 n.6. 
 139 See, e.g., United States v. Torniero, 735 F.2d 725, 731 (2d Cir. 1984); United 
States v. Gould, 735 F.2d 725, 727 n.6 (4th Cir. 1984); Lisa Gonzalez, The Admissibility of 
Scientific Evidence: The History and Demise of Frye v. United States, 48 U. MIAMI L. REV. 
371, 382–84 (1993); CHARLES T. MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 203, at 873 
(John W. Strong ed., 4th ed. 1992). 
 140 MICHAEL H. GRAHAM, MODERN STATE AND FEDERAL EVIDENCE: A COMPREHENSIVE 
REFERENCE TEXT 329 (1989). 
 141 Torniero, 735 F.2d at 731. 
 142 State v. Hennum, 441 N.W.2d 793, 798–99 (Minn. 1989) (emphasis added). 
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Courts have avoided explicitly stating that the same 
evidence would not have met the general acceptance standard. 
They have instead determined that they need not decide the 
issue because the evidence can be properly admitted under a 
substantial acceptance standard. For example, in United States 
v. Williams, the court first noted divided persuasive authority 
and evidence presented on the issue of general acceptance within 
the relevant scientific community for stenographic voice identification. 
It then dodged the general acceptance determination and found 
that acceptance “by a substantial section of the scientific community 
concerned” was enough to mandate admission of the evidence.143 
By applying this standard the court was able to admit evidence 
that may well have been excluded under the general acceptance 
standard without having to make that explicit determination.  
Despite this evolution of the substantial acceptance standard 
and widespread criticism of Kelly-Frye as too conservative, one 
scholar argues that even this more stringent rule “does not 
adequately screen novel scientific techniques.”144 To solve this 
problem, Professor and Forensic Consultant Andre Moenssens 
places a strong emphasis on the need to establish a flexible 
procedure, rather than a static test, to directly replace Kelly-Frye 
in dealing with the admission of novel scientific evidence.145 The 
key to this procedure is emphasizing reliability over consensus at 
three distinct stages of litigation: discovery, pretrial hearing, and 
decision-making.146 This can be achieved by: (1) requiring expert 
reports subject to discovery to contain information regarding the 
underlying methodology employed and the people involved in 
employing it, rather than merely conclusions reached;147 (2) allowing 
increased deposition of opposing witnesses;148 (3) increasing systematic 
use of, and judges’ active participation in, the motion in limine to 
resolve admissibility issues prior to trial;149 and (4) employing a 
number of concrete factors to aid judges in admissibility decisions.150 
 
 143 U.S. v. Williams, 443 F. Supp. 269, 273 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (emphasis added). 
 144 Moenssens, supra note 39, at 547. 
 145 Id. at 564. 
 146 Id. at 568. 
 147 Id. at 568–71. 
 148 Id. 
 149 Id. at 571–73. 
 150 The eleven suggested factors are: 
(1) [T]he potential error rate in using the technique, (2) the existence and 
maintenance of standards governing its use, (3) presence of safeguards in the 
characteristics of the technique, (4) analogy to other scientific techniques 
whose results are admissible, (5) the extent to which the technique has been 
accepted by scientists in the field involved, (6) the nature and breadth of the 
inference adduced, (7) the clarity and simplicity with which the technique can 
be described and its results explained, (8) the extent to which the basic data 
are verifiable by the court and jury, (9) the availability of other experts to test 
Do Not Delete 7/11/17 8:06 PM 
414 Chapman Law Review [Vol. 20:2 
By employing these methods, the options available to judges and 
overall flexibility of the approach can be increased, allowing the 
focus to center on underlying reliability. 
Finally, in one very recent solution, Professor Pamela Katz 
incorporates the use of artificial intelligence (“AI”) to help judges 
in making pretrial Daubert admissibility decisions.151 She begins 
by taking note of the legal community’s tendency to fear 
emerging technology, particularly where it relates to the 
substance of the law rather than merely the efficiency of its 
practice.152 Then, however, she explains how her solution would 
provide critical assistance to a judge but leave the ultimate 
decision in the judge’s hands.153 Armed with both legal and 
scientific databases, the AI machine would probe published 
scientific literature in the relevant field exploring that 
discipline’s chosen methodologies and supported reasoning.154 It 
would then evaluate the proffered testimony in light of these 
databases and its programmed rules to decide whether the 
evidence complies with the Daubert, and other, factors before 
ultimately displaying its results to the judge.155  
While this novel approach to addressing Daubert’s shortcomings 
adds much to the discussion, the introduction of these machines 
also exaggerates these concerns. The use of these robots 
implicates an additional layer of inquiry—before allowing the 
machines to be used, it would be necessary for the court to 
determine whether the databases and algorithms employed by 
the machine in question are themselves reliable and scientifically 
valid. This puts the trial judge back in his or her original 
position, left to apply the same test, with the same challenges156 
this innovative approach was designed to overcome. Furthermore, 
prominent concerns about infringing on the fact-finding province 
of the jury157 apply with equal, if not greater, force when the 
 
and evaluate the technique, (10) the probative significance of the evidence in 
the circumstances of the case, and (11) the care with which the technique was 
employed in the case. 
Id. at 573–74 (quoting Mark McCormick, Scientific Evidence: Defining a New Approach to 
Admissibility, 67 IOWA L. REV. 879, 911–12 (1982)). 
 151 See generally Pamela S. Katz, Expert Robot: Using Artificial Intelligence to Assist 
Judges in Admitting Scientific Expert Testimony, 24 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 3 (2014) 
(explaining that AI machines can follow directions, but can also “determine whether the 
instructions are correct, whether there is a better method to reach the desired results, or 
if the process had been used successfully before”). 
 152 Id. at 3. 
 153 Id. at 36–37. 
 154 Id. at 37. 
 155 See id. at 39. 
 156 See generally supra Part II.B. 
 157 See supra Part II.B.2. 
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infringing entity is no longer a trier of fact in any form, but 
rather an artificial device and the algorithms it employs. 
B. A New Approach Altogether: Expanding the Use of the 
American Association for the Advancement of Science’s 
Court-Appointed Scientific Experts Program 
Ultimately, the proposals discussed above either go too far or 
do not go far enough—each either does not fully confront the 
criticism of the current standards or infringes too deeply on the 
parties’ rights. What California needs is a middle ground 
between these various extremes. This article now proposes such a 
solution that comes in the form of imposing an additional prong 
to the Kelly-Frye test. This new prong would require trial judges 
to consult with Court-Appointed Scientific Experts in 
determining the admissibility of novel expert scientific evidence.  
Justice Blackmun himself, in the Daubert majority opinion, 
noted that, in part, the majority’s confidence “that federal judges 
possess the capacity to undertake this review” was derived 
from their authority to appoint experts under Federal Rule of 
Evidence 706.158 The Rule sets forth a number of procedures, 
including those for appointment, assignment of duties, reporting 
of findings, and compensation of experts.159 A judge additionally 
has the broader, inherent authority to appoint experts “necessary 
to permit the court to carry out its duties, including authority to 
appoint a technical advisor to consult with the court during the 
decision-making process.”160 
Over twenty years ago, researchers Joe Cecil and Thomas 
Willging of the Federal Judicial Center conducted a mail and 
telephone survey of 425 then-active federal judges to inquire into 
the frequency of and reasons for appointment of experts under 
such sources of authority.161 The results of this survey revealed 
that appointments were made much more frequently than 
previously suspected based on a low rate of reference to such 
experts in published opinions.162 From these results, two primary 
reasons a judge would invoke an expert emerged: (1) to aid 
decision-making on the merits of the litigation; and (2) to aid 
settlement.163 Critically, the study revealed almost unanimous 
 
 158 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595. 
 159 FED. R. EVID. 706. 
 160 Joe S. Cecil & Thomas E. Willging, Accepting Daubert’s Invitation: Defining a Role 
for Court-Appointed Experts in Assessing Scientific Validity, 43 EMORY L.J. 995, 998 (1994). 
 161 Id. at 997 n.7. 
 162 Id. at 1004–05. The eighty-six judges who responded that they had made one or 
more such appointments in fact made approximately 225 appointments. Id.  
 163 Id. at 1009–15. 
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satisfaction on the part of those judges that had previously made 
appointments, with only two of the sixty-five responding to this 
question failing to indicate that they were “pleased with the 
services provided.”164 
As such, it is clear that no one questions the ability and 
authority of a judge to appoint such an expert if he or she so 
chooses.165 Despite the judges’ own satisfaction with the experts, 
several critics have questioned whether they would be prudent in 
so doing.166 This criticism centers around the lack of parameters 
provided for a judge in the process of appointing,167 supervising,168 
and paying169 such experts. In light of these claims, the logical 
response is to establish such parameters, not to give up an 
apparently otherwise satisfactory process entirely.  
Enter the Court-Appointed Scientific Experts (“CASE”) 
Project. Under this service, the American Association for the 
Advancement of Science (“AAAS”), an international non-profit 
organization,170 assists both federal and state judges “in 
identifying highly qualified scientists, engineers, and healthcare 
professionals to serve as scientific experts.”171 Started as a 
demonstration project in 2001, as a result of the report of the 
National Conference of Lawyers & Scientists Task Force on 
Science & Technology in the Courts,172 the project serves as a 
link between the courts and scientific communities.173  
 
 164 Id. at 1008. 
 165 See FED. R. EVID. 706 advisory committee’s note (“The inherent power of a trial 
judge to appoint an expert of his own choosing is virtually unquestioned.”).  
 166 Note, Improving Judicial Gatekeeping: Technical Advisors and Scientific 
Evidence, 110 HARV. L. REV. 941, 942, 946–49 (1997). 
 167 See, e.g., JOE S. CECIL & THOMAS E. WILLGING, COURT-APPOINTED EXPERTS: 
DEFINING THE ROLE OF EXPERTS APPOINTED UNDER FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE 706 23 
(1993), http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/experts.pdf/$file/experts.pdf [http://perma.cc/ 
5YGS-LEB8]. 
 168 See, e.g., 29 CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 
6261 (1st ed. 1997). 
 169 See Cecil & Willging, supra note 160, at 1055–56 (noting that the need for 
guidance is exacerbated where one of the parties is indignant). 
 170 AAAS is the largest multidisciplinary scientific society in the world. Mark S. 
Frankel, Considering Advances in Neuroscience Through the Lenses of Law and Human 
Rights, 1 J.L. & BIOSCI. 215, 216 (2014), http://jlb.oxfordjournals.org/content/1/2/215.full 
[http://perma.cc/R2JE-6GE8]. 
 171 Court Appointed Scientific Experts (CASE), AM. ASS’N FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF SCI., 
http://www.aaas.org/page/court-appointed-scientific-experts-case [http://perma.cc/S69F-JTGG]. 
 172 AAAS-ABA NAT’L CONFERENCE OF LAWYERS & SCIENTISTS TASK FORCE ON 
SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY IN THE COURTS, ENHANCING THE AVAILABILITY OF RELIABLE AND 
IMPARTIAL SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL EXPERTISE TO THE FEDERAL COURTS: A REPORT TO 
THE CARNEGIE COMMISSION ON SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND GOVERNMENT (1991). 
 173 CASE: History, AM. ASS’N FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF SCI., http://www.aaas.org/page/ 
case-history [http://perma.cc/J43G-PUJK]. 
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As part of the CASE project, AAAS assists judges by: (1) locating 
and recommending experts in a variety of scientific and technical 
fields; (2) independently evaluating the qualifications and 
potential biases of scientists proposed by one or more parties to 
serve as court experts; (3) advising on the management of 
litigation involving experts recommended through the project; 
and (4) assisting judges in refining the scope of the need for the 
expert and determining what kinds of experts are most appropriate 
to address those needs.174 This proposal focuses primarily on 
AAAS’s role in formally and thoroughly vetting the qualifications 
and neutrality of experts in order to ensure that the 
recommendations made to the trial judges regarding the 
admissibility of the evidence are themselves reliable. This 
independent evaluation is conducted by the Recruitment and 
Screening Panel, focusing on the purported experts’ “scientific 
merit, reputation, and the ability to communicate highly 
technical information to non-scientific audiences.”175 
The goal of the Task Force was “to create a system that could 
‘find an expert who would provide the judge independent and 
reliable advice that would be free from taint,’” and the CASE 
program seems to be doing just that.176 Currently, the program 
has been used by judges in sixteen jurisdictions, including three 
of the four federal districts in California, as well as the Department 
of Health and Human Services Departmental Appeals Board.177 
Much like the surveyed federal judges using court-appointed 
experts generally, many judges using the CASE program have 
expressed satisfaction with the experience.178 One such judge 
from the Central District of California using the service 
proclaimed, “[t]he judges [in this District] would benefit from a 
presentation about the fine services that AAAS makes 
available.”179 This satisfaction is due in part to the ease of 
 
 174 Court Appointed Scientific Experts (CASE), AM. ASS’N FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF SCI., 
http://www.aaas.org/page/court-appointed-scientific-experts-case [http://perma.cc/S69F-JTGG]; 
CASE Experience, AM. ASS’N FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF SCI., http://www.aaas.org/page/case- 
experience [http://perma.cc/6U5W-2PKK]. 
 175 CASE: Recruitment and Screening Panel, AM. ASS’N FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF 
SCI., http://www.aaas.org/page/case-recruitment-and-screening-panel [http://perma.cc/DBW3- 
PMUU]. 
 176 Tom Price, Explaining Science in the Courtroom, OPTICS & PHONICS NEWS, Nov. 
2007, at 16–17, http://www.osa-opn.org/Content/ViewFile.aspx?id=10904 (quoting Carnegie 
Institution President Richard Meserve) [http://perma.cc/DBW3-PMUU]. 
 177 CASE Experience, AM. ASS’N FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF SCI., http://www.aaas.org/page/ 
case-experience [http://perma.cc/6U5W-2PKK]. 
 178 Id. 
 179 Id. A Nebraska judge extending his thanks to the AAAS director, stated that 
“[y]our assistance allowed me to offer to the parties a totally objective examination of the 
case by qualified and competent experts. . . . The CASE project is an incredibly valuable 
tool to federal judges.” Id. 
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administration provided by AAAS through uniform procedures 
contained in two handbooks—one for the appointing judges and 
one for the appointed expert. These handbooks set forth the 
additional information critics and judges alike had previously 
found lacking in the power to appoint under Federal Rule 706.180 
In terms of the issue at hand, the CASE program can be 
implemented on a widespread scale to assist judges during the 
process of making pretrial admissibility determinations. The expert’s 
services would be used by the judge on a consultation-only basis 
during the hearing. The expert would address concerns including 
whether the necessary level of consensus has been reached and 
whether there is a significant minority whose objections merit 
consideration in weighing that consensus. Restricting the 
program expert to a consulting role, rather than allowing the 
experts to testify at trial, ameliorates concerns about the effect 
on a jury of the status of the expert as “court-appointed.”181 
Furthermore, by introducing these neutral experts at the pretrial 
stage of a civil case, the parties may be motivated to settle the 
litigation, preventing the need for a trial altogether.182 In this 
way the proposed solution could not only help ensure that 
Kelly-Frye- or Daubert-style rulings are correctly decided, but 
could also serve the public policies of encouraging settlement and 
conserving valuable judicial resources.  
In addition, this implementation of the program can address 
several concerns raised by critics regarding the need for 
increased guidelines and uniformity of use. For example, the 
American Bar Association has already begun to promulgate such 
guidelines.183 These standards for court-appointed experts allow 
testimony only in “exceptional cases” and prefer that the 
testimony play no role in jury trials. If such testimony is allowed 
in a jury trial, the jury should usually not be told that a testifying 
expert was appointed by the judge.184 Such a disclosure, an author 
of the standards argues, could subvert the adversary system “if a 
 
 180 See generally AM. ASS’N FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF SCI., COURT APPOINTED 
SCIENTIFIC EXPERTS: HANDBOOK FOR JUDGES (2002), http://www.aaas.org/sites/default/files/ 
migrate/uploads/handbookjudges4.pdf [http://perma.cc/SXG9-W69V]; AM. ASS’N FOR THE 
ADVANCEMENT OF SCI., COURT APPOINTED SCIENTIFIC EXPERTS: A HANDBOOK FOR 
EXPERTS (2002), http://www.aaas.org/sites/default/files/migrate/uploads/handbookexperts3.pdf. 
[http://perma.cc/M3GU-KZQ5]. 
 181 See Price, supra note 176, at 17. 
 182 See id. at 176 (“The mere prospect of testimony from an independent expert seems 
to spur settlement . . . .”); Deborah C. Runkle, Court-Appointed Scientific Experts: 
Providing Objective Scientific Advice to the Judiciary, in SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE REVIEW: 
CURRENT ISSUES AT THE CROSSROADS OF SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW 19, 24 
(Cynthia H. Cwik & Helen E. Witt eds., 2006). 
 183 A.B.A., CIVIL TRIAL PRACTICE STANDARDS 8 (2007). 
 184 Id. at 9. 
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jury gives more credence to the testimony of an independent 
expert simply because he was appointed by the judge.”185 
Limiting the use of these experts to pretrial consultation avoids 
these issues of jury influence. 
This approach also avoids a key concern that neutral 
court-appointed experts take away the parties’ ability to choose 
their own experts. This issue is not implicated by the use of 
CASE program experts as consultants to trial judges in making 
admissibility decisions because each party remains free to select 
its own experts, not only for the Kelly-Frye hearing, but also for 
testifying at trial. The court-appointed expert simply serves as an 
aid to the judge in evaluating the reliability of the evidence 
presented by those adversary-appointed experts before it can be 
admitted. While some authors have suggested that these experts 
replace party experts, neither the program itself nor this article 
advances such an approach. Rather, the CASE program envisions 
“only the use of court experts as a supplement to party 
experts.”186 In this way, the CASE program expert is merely 
another resource for the trial judge to consult in making his or 
her reliability determination. 
Finally, while this proposal would require a trial judge to 
confer with and consider the recommendation of the CASE 
program’s expert, the judge is not to be bound by that decision. 
The admissibility determination made following the hearing and 
consultation remains fully in his or her hands. This ensures not 
only the autonomy of the judge in issuing his or her ruling, but 
further provides litigants an order appealable in the same 
manner and to the same extent as it would have been absent the 
required participation of the CASE program expert. 
In short, the use of the CASE program would take Kelly-Frye 
a step closer to becoming a comprehensive procedure based on 
cooperation between the legal and scientific communities. The 
appointed scientific experts would additionally serve a similar 
role to Katz’s “Expert Robot,” without the need to introduce an 
element of technology both uncomfortable to judges and carrying 
precisely the “misleading aura of scientific infallibility” from 
which the tests seek to free the jury. Finally, CASE experts 
would serve a similar role to experts appointed under Federal 
Rule 706 without the accompanying concerns related to a lack of 
guidelines and the need for vetting bias because AAAS has 
already taken care of both of these aspects long before the expert 
is ever presented to the judge. 
 
 185 Price, supra note 176, at 17. 
 186 Runkle, supra note 182, at 23. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
By mandating the use of experts under CASE or a similarly 
designed state program, California could confront the shortcomings 
of Kelly-Frye head on without running head-long into the 
problems plaguing Daubert. In this context, the CASE program 
would serve two primary functions: (1) identification of the 
relevant community to evaluate a novel scientific method; and 
(2) evaluation and recommendation of one or more qualified, 
unbiased experts to be appointed by the court to testify to such 
an evaluation. By working with appointed scientific experts on a 
pre-trial basis, the trial judge can directly consult the relevant 
scientific community to determine whether that community 
generally accepts the validity of a given methodology beyond the 
simple head-counting required under what would now become 
the first of two prongs of California’s test. In this way, the judge 
is asked to work with an actual scientist rather than to become 
an amateur one. Through this procedure, the expert would first 
offer guidance on whether the proffered technique was, in fact, 
novel. He or she could then help to both define and provide 
valuable insight into the relevant community. After these 
determinations are made, the CASE role would end before trial 
began, eliminating concerns without imposing any misleading 
aura on, or infringing on the providence of, the jury.  
In a system where a significant majority of civil jury trials 
involve expert testimony, and where the result of either a Kelly-Frye 
or Daubert hearing is very often outcome determinative, the 
shortcomings of the current alternatives can no longer be 
ignored. By incorporating the best of each test and modifying 
problem areas, California courts can act as legal trailblazers once 
again in the quest to ensure the validity of the expert scientific 
evidence that plays such an increasingly prominent role in our 
modern trials.  
 
